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180 Michigan Law Review 
MOTOR VEIDCLES-LEGISLATION-The Michigan 
Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act 
[Vol. 65 
With the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act,1 
the State of Michigan has treated a lingering problem with a remedy 
which is in some respects new in the United States. The Michigan 
Act is the most recent and radical of the many solutions advanced 
during the last forty years for the problems posed by the financially 
irresponsible motorist-tort-feasor.2 Although several proposed solu-
tions have suggested replacing to some degree the basic negligence 
system of tort liability, 3 the programs which have actually been 
adopted are designed to £unction within the framework of that 
system. Protection against the financially irresponsible motorist may 
be provided by the so-called "fund approach," which, basically, pro-
vides compensation from a state pool for certain persons injured by 
culpable uninsured or unidentified motorists. A more common 
treatment of the problem, however, has been the "insurance ap-
proach" which assumes different forms in various states. Under one 
of the earlier plans, the Financial Responsibility Act, a driver who 
is unable to compensate his first accident victim is required to 
establish, in order to retain his driving privileges, his capacity to 
reimburse future victims.4 However, most states have adopted the 
so-called Security Responsibility Act5 which requires a motorist-
tort-feasor to post security £or present as well as future judgments.6 
A third alternative, adopted in three states, is a system of compul-
1. MICH, COMP. LAws §§ 257.1101-.1131 (Supp. 1965) (hereinafter cited as Michigan 
Act], as amended, Mich. Pub. Acts 1965, No. 389 (hereinafter cited as Michigan 
Amendment]. 
2. For a bibliography which includes books and articles on all the major propo• 
sals, see KEETON &: O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 519-42 
(1966) (hereinafter cited as KEETON &: O'CONNELL]. This study also contains an explana-
tion and critique of the important proposals. See id. at 76-240. For other bibliog-
raphies, see GREGORY &: KALVEN, CASES ON TORTS xlix-lii (1959); 9 PRAc. LAw. 91 
(October 1963). 
3. E.g., COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR REsEARCH IN TiiE SoCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT 
BY THE COM!l!ITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932) (work-
men's compensation approach); CONARD, MORGAN, PRATT, VOLTZ &: BOMBAUGH, AUTO-
MOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1965) (social insurance); KEETON & O'CONNELL 
273-482 (basic protection insurance). For a discussion of the Columbia University plan 
see Smith, Lilly & Dowling, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 
32 CoLuM. L. REv. 785 (1932). Several books and articles have been written criticizing 
the strict liability approach. See, e.g., BLUM & KALvEN, PUBUC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A 
PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM-AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS (1965). 
4. For the provisions of a financial responsibility statute which has been super-
seded by a security responsibility statute, see, e.g., OHIO LAws 1935, § 6298-1 to -25, 
at 218. See also KEETON &: O'CONNELL 103-05. 
5. The Security Responsibility Act has replaced the older financial responsibility 
law in most states. KEETON & O'CONNELL 106. 
6. E.g., W. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 1721(482)-(539) (1961). Many of these statutes were 
patterned after the UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE §§ 7-101 to -505. See Kesler v. Department 
of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 165 (1962). See also KEETON &: O'CONNELL 105-09. 
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sory liability insurance under which all automobile registrants must 
carry a minimum amount of public liability insurance.7 Finally, 
somewhat more common than the compulsory liability system,8 is 
the compulsory uninsured motorist endorsement plan which re-
quires all persons holding liability insurance to carry a minimum 
amount of protection against uninsured motorists. By means of the 
endorsement, the insurer agrees to pay the insured a stated portion 
of the damages which the insured would be entitled to recover 
from a financially irresponsible tort-feasor.9 
With the adoption of the Michigan Act, Michigan has become 
the fifth state10 to adopt a comprehensive program utilizing both 
the insurance and the fund approaches. Moreover, the Michigan 
Act, apparently inspired by its Ontario prototype,11 contains some 
elements which were previously unknown in United States legisla-
tion.12 Consequently, it may prove enlightening to examine the 
scope and purpose of the Michigan Act, and to compare it with 
similar legislation in other states. 
Source of the Michigan Fund 
The Michigan Fund consists of assessments against registrants 
of all motor vehicles13 in Michigan beginning with the 1966 regis-
7. Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 90, §§ 34A-J, ch. 175, §§ 113A-J (1959), as 
amended, MASS ANN. LAws ch. 90, §§ 34 A,D,H,J,K (Supp. 1965), ch. 175, §§ 113 
A,B,D,K (Supp. 1965); New York: N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW §§ 310-21; North 
Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1965). For a treatment of these 
statutes see KEETON &: O'CONNELL 76-102. 
8. KEETON &: O'CONNELL lll. 
9. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 268, § 15 (1955). For a discussion of the New 
Hampshire Act and some of the problems arising under it, see Kelly, Kirouac v. 
Healey: Comments on the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement in New Hampshire, 7 
N.H.B.J. 91 (1965). 
10. The four states other than Michigan are: Maryland: Mn. ANN. ConE art. 66½, 
§§ 150-79 (Supp. 1965), as amended, Md. Laws 1965, chs. 93, 298, 494, 540-44, 557, 692, 
874 [hereinafter cited as Maryland Act]; New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 to -91 
(Supp. 1965) [hereinafter cited as New Jersey Act]; New York: N.Y. INs. I.Aw §§ 600-26 
[hereinafter cited as New York Act]; North Dakota: N.D. CENT. ConE §§ 39-17-01 to 
-10 (Supp. 1965), as amended, N.D. Laws 1965, chs. 52, 187 [hereinafter cited as North 
Dakota Act]. 
11. Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, 1962, 10 & ll Eliz. 2, c. 84 (Ont.), as 
amended, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Amendment Act, 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz. 2, c. 66 
(Ont.), as amended, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Amendment Act, 1965, 13 &: 14 
Eliz. 2, c. 75 (Ont.). See Letter From Rep. Marvin R. Stempien to the Michigan Law 
Review, Nov. 1, 1965. Representative Stempien is one of the co-authors of the 
Michigan Act. 
12. For a history of the fund idea in the United States see generally Elder, The 
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund and the Irresponsible Motorist, 1953-1954 CURRENT TRENDS 
IN STATE LEGISLATION 45, 54-59 (1954). 
13. Michigan Amendment § 3. Neither "vehicle" nor "registrant" is defined in the 
statute. Apparently, however, the word "vehicle" includes such things as motorcycles, 
and the word "registrant" includes dealers. 0Ps. MICH. Arr'y GEN., No. 4453 Gan. 31, 
1966). 
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tration year.14 Insured registrants15 are assessed one dollar for each 
registered vehicle while uninsured registrants are assessed thirty-five 
dollars.16 By thus placing the major burden for the financing of the 
system on the uninsured motorist, the Michigan Fund is distin-
guished from the funds of other states, which funds are typically 
sustained by assessments against those insurance companies writing 
liability policies within the state.17 
Although a lack of operational experience and the incalculable 
impact of numerous variables preclude accurate prediction as to 
the ultimate success of the Michigan Fund, it is possible that the 
present system of financing will be inadequate to sustain the Fund. 
The Secretary of State of Michigan, the official representative of the 
Fund,18 has speculated that 1,000 claims against the Fund will be 
presented during every month of 1966.19 If this prediction proves 
correct, 6,000 claims will have been presented during the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1966. Approximately $8,000,000 has been ap-
propriated to the Fund for that period, of which more than 
$7,000,000 is designated for claim settlements.20 Thus, if every 
claim forecast by the Secretary were paid, an average recovery of 
about $1,200 per claim would exhaust the Fund by the end of the 
fiscal year. An even more ominous sign as to the potential financial 
stability of the Michigan Fund is the fact that other less liberal 
fund programs have encountered considerable financial difficulty; 
recent studies indicate that the Maryland and New Jersey Funds 
are in substantial danger of insolvency.21 
14. Michigan Amendment §§ 3(2)-(3). 
15. The Michigan Act refers to the state's Security Responsibility Act, MICH. CoMP. 
LAws §§ 257.501-.532 (Supp. 1961), for the definition of an insured registrant. To 
be considered insured under this act, one must hold a policy which will pay 
$10,000 for the death or injury of one person, $20,000 for the death or injury of 
two or more persons, and $5,000 for the destruction of property. To be self-insured a 
person must have twenty-five vehicles registered in his name and satisfy the Secretary 
of State that he will be able to pay all judgments against him. 
16. Michigan Amendment §§ 3(2)-(3). For the criminal liability provisions for 
persons furnishing false information at the time of registration and for those who fail 
to furnish evidence of payment of the fee when demanded by a peace officer, see 
Michigan Act §§ 4, 10; Michigan Amendment §§ 3(4), 6(5)-(6). 
17. Maryland assesses insurance companies and uninsured registrants. Maryland 
Act § 151. New Jersey assesses insurance companies and all registrants. New Jersey Act 
§ 39:6-63. New York assesses only insurance companies. New York Act § 607. North 
Dakota assesses only registrants without regard to insurance status. North Dakota Act 
§ 39-17-01. 
18. In practice the claims will be administered by a director with or without an 
advisory board. See generally ·wenck &: Storm, Michigan's Motor Vehicl~ Claims Act, 
Michigan Economic Record, Oct. 1965, p. 2. 
19. Ann Arbor Conference on Auto Insurance 34 (Sept. 15-16, 1965) (remarks of 
Secretary of State James Hare, on file with the Michigan Law Review) (hereinafter 
cited as Ann Arbor Conference]. 
20. See ENROLLED S.B. No. 687, 73d Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1965). 
21. See Hasmi, Unsatisfied Judgment Funds, 33 J. RisK &: !Ns, 93 (1964). 
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Persons Entitled To Recover 
In th~ five states utilizing the fund approach, the claimant must 
meet various statutory qualifications in order to recover from the 
fund. All of the states require the claimant to have a cause of action 
un~er tort law which would entitle him to be compensated by the 
umnsured tort-feasor.22 In Michigan, the statute permits a claimant 
to recover from the Fund without a prior judgment against the 
uninsured,23 so long as there is a valid claim. 
A second requirement in four of the five fund states is that the 
claimant must establish that the tort-feasor is either uninsured or 
unidentified.24 A determination as to whether the tort-feasor had 
originally secured a liability insurance policy could easily be made 
by inspecting his registration certificate.25 However, the claimant 
may encounter substantial difficulties when the tort-feasor's insurer 
disclaims liability,26 and the Fund refuses to recognize the validity 
of the insurer's disclaimer;27 no procedure is provided for such a 
situation in the Michigan Act. Although it would be possible for 
the claimant to bring suit against the tort-feasor, thereby forcing 
the disclaimer issue into court,28 such an approach would be un-
desirable; not only would it impose the burden of litigation on the 
claimant, but it would also deprive the claimant of the speedy and 
inexpensive procedures described below for claiming and receiving 
· compensation without acquiring a prior judgment.29 Although the 
Secretary's discretion to refuse to make payment from the Fund 
should be exercised when the claimant does not deserve the amount 
sought, it seems clear that the claimant should be compensated by 
someone when the only ground on which the Secretary refuses 
22, Maryland Act§ 158; Michigan Amendment §§ 6, 7, 12; New Jersey Act §§ 39: 
6-69 to -78; New York Act § 608; North Dakota Act § 39-17-03. 
23, See Michigan Amendment § 6. See generally text accompanying notes 52-56 
infra. This qualification is obviously automatically satisfied where the claim is being 
made on an unsatisfied judgment. See Michigan Amendment § 7. 
24. Maryland Act § 159(e); Michigan Amendment §§ 6, 7, 12; New Jersey Act 
§§ 39:6-70(£) to -78; New York Act § 610. The Michigan Act has dispensed with the 
qualification found in other fund states that the claimant himself must carry liability 
insurance which meets prescribed standards. See Maryland Act § 159(c); New Jersey 
Act §§ 39:6-70(d); New York Act § 6ll(b). 
25. See Michigan Act §§ 4(2)-(3). A problem may exist where the tort-feasor's in-
surance has lapsed or been cancelled and he has not paid the thirty-five-dollar fee as 
required. See generally Michigan Amendment § 3(5). 
26. Three fund states have specific provisions for disclaimer cases. See Maryland 
Act § 154(a); New Jersey Act § 39-6-65; New York Act §§ 608(c), 620. See generally 
Note, 39 ST. JoHN's L. RE.v. 321, 337-38 (1965). 
27, For a discussion of this situation, see McCullough, The Uninsured Motorist, 33 
N.Y.S.B.J. 343, 348 (1961). 
28. This procedure may be utilized under Michigan Amendment § 7. See generally 
text accompanying notes 43-51 infra. 
29. This procedure under Michigan Amendment § 6 is discussed in text accom-
panying notes 52-56 infra. 
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to pay is the questioned validity of the insurer's disclaimer. The pro-
cess of speedy recovery envisioned by the drafters of the Michigan 
Act30 would be more readily effectuated by an amendment authoriz-
ing the Secretary to immediately reimburse the claimant in such 
cases and thereafter settle the disclaimer issue with the insurer 
by arbitration31 or, if necessary, litigation. Regardless of the resolu-
tion of the issue of the validity of the disclaimer, the Fund would 
be subrogated to the rights of the claimant32 against the tort-feasor; 
if the insurer's disclaimer were invalid, the Fund could recover 
from the insurer, whereas if the disclaimer were valid, the Secretary 
could proceed against the tort-feasor as if he were an uninsured 
motorist.33 
A third qualification existing in various forms in all five fund 
states is the locale-residency requirement.34 In order to recover from 
the Michigan Fund, the accident must have occurred on a Michigan 
highway, and the claimant must have been a resident either of 
Michigan or of a state which extends reciprocal treatment to Michi-
gan residents.35 The residency requirement may be justified by the 
necessity of protecting the Fund from depletion by non-contributing 
out-of-state residents.36 The reciprocity provision is equally justifi-
able as an assurance that Michigan residents will be compensated 
when injured in those fund states which, because of Michigan's 
reciprocal treatment for their residents, provide equal treatment 
for Michigan residents.37 On the other hand, the locale require-
ment, as applied to contributing residents, has been criticized on the 
ground that a state has as great an interest in compensating residents 
injured outside the state as it has in compensating those injured 
30. See Letter From Rep. Marvin R. Stempien to the Michigan Law Review, Nov. 
1, 1965. 
31. See McCullough, supra note 27, at 348. 
32. Michigan Amendment § 6(4). 
33. See text accompanying note 54 infra. 
34. Maryland Act § 150(g); New Jersey Act § 39:6-62; New York Act § 60l(b); 
North Dakota Act § 39-17-03. 
35. Michigan Amendment §§ 6, 7, J2; Michigan Act § 25. 
36. Cf. Benson v. Schneider, 68 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1955). Several problems have 
arisen in regard to who is a resident or domiciliary of a particular state. See, e.g., 
Williamson v. Potter, 80 N.J. Super. 517, 194 A.2d 261 (L. 1963) (a soldier while on 
duty in New Jersey may recover from the fund); Sullivan v. Saylor, 79 N.J. Super. 1, 
190 A.2d 193 (App. Div. 1963) (a person who has a secondary home in New Jersey 
cannot claim against the New Jersey Fund); Catalanotto v. Palazzolo, 46 Misc. 2d 381, 
259 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (one illegally in the United States may nevertheless 
be a resident of New York). 
37. Cf. White v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 39 Misc. 2d 678, 
686, 241 N.Y.S.2d 566, 575 (Sup. Ct. 1963), where the court stated: "What is im-
portant to New York is the expansion of extraterritorial protection for New York 
citizens. The section is designed to encourage foreign jurisdictions to abandon anti-
quated non-liability rules with a view to reciprocity consistent with modem enter-
prise and social advancement." See generally Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National 
and International Protection Presently Available and Comparative Problems in Sub-
stantial Similarity, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 283 (1960). 
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within its borders.38 At the present time the Michigan resident 
traveling out-of-state would be able to recover for injuries suffered 
at the hands of an uninsured motorist in only three states: Mary-
land, 39 New Jersey4° and New York.41 Notwithstanding the paucity 
of states affording reciprocity, the harshness of the locale require-
ment will be greatly alleviated by the recently enacted uninsured 
motorist endorsement statute, 42 which requires all liability insurers 
to provide minimum uninsured motorist protection to purchasers 
of liability policies in Michigan unless such coverage is expressly 
refused in ·writing. This statute means, in effect, that most Michigan 
liability insurance holders will be covered regardless of the locale of 
the accident. Such coverage will not extend, however, to uninsured 
persons injured in non-fund states, and, thus, a significant number 
of contributing Michigan residents will be unable to recover from 
the Michigan Fund, a non-Michigan reciprocal fund or the unin-
sured motorist insurance carrier. Deletion of the locale requirement 
would more readily comport with the liberal tenor of the Michigan 
Act, for such a change would provide pervasive protection for all 
Michigan residents whose contributions entitle them to the Michi-
gan Fund's benefits, regardless of the fortuitous circumstance of 
where the accident occurs. 
Methods of Recovery 
Persons who qualify for renumeration from the Michigan Fund 
are given three basic methods of recovery: unsatisfied judgment pro-
cedure, non-judgment claim procedure, and hit-and-run procedure. 
The first of these is the unsatisfied judgment claim whereby a 
claimant brings suit against the tort-feasor, obtains a judgment, and 
applies to the Michigan Fund for payment of any portion of the 
judgment which has not been satisfied by the tort-feasor.43 In such 
cases the original service of process must be made on the Secretary, 
as the defendant's agent, who then forwards the process to the de-
fendant. Failure to serve the Secretary constitutes a bar to subse-
quent recovery from the Fund. The Secretary may intervene in the 
action if he wishes.44 Once the claimant obtains a judgment for 
damages and applies for payment, the Secretary may object to the 
judgment on the ground that the claimant has not pursued a 
38. See Comment, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 1075, 1076-77 (1965). 
39. Maryland Act § 150(g) has been construed to extend only to domiciliaries, 
not residents, of other fund states. Cf. Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172, 186 A.2d 482 
(1962). 
40. New Jersey Act § 39:6-62. 
41. New York Act § 60l(b). 
42. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13010 (Supp. 1965). 
43. Michigan Amendment § 7; cf. Maryland Act §§ 154-66; New Jersey Act 
§§ 39:6-65 to -77; New York Act §§ 608-16; North Dakota Act § 39-17-03. 
44. Michigan Act § 5. No other fund state seems to have such a provision for 
service on the fund's representative. 
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remedy against all possible defendants, 45 thereby forcing the claim-
ant to return to the court which rendered the judgment for a 
determination on the Secretary's objection.46 It might be argued 
that this procedure is unduly burdensome on the plaintiff-claimant, 
especially since the Secretary had been served and could have 
become a party to the suit, thereby settling all of the issues in one 
proceeding. However, it must be noted that if the Secretary were 
not permitted to object to a judgment, he would, in effect, be forced 
to intervene in every action throughout the state to which he might 
have an objection. Thus, the prospect of minimizing expenditures 
by the Fund together with the fact that the present procedure will 
probably not impose on the plaintiff-claimant any substantial loss 
of time or money seem to justify retention of the present provision. 
Other safeguards are provided to protect the Fund in cases in-
volving unsatisfied judgments. If the uninsured defendant defaults 
or wishes to enter a consent judgment, the Secretary must be given 
sufficient notice to enable him to take appropriate action in place of 
and binding upon the defendant.41 The Secretary has thirty days 
from the date of notice in which to act. If the pleadings have been 
closed, he may reopen them and conduct a defense.48 However, it is 
unclear whether, once a consent or default judgment has been 
rendered, the Secretary may waive the notice requirement and re-
open the case.49 Although the Michigan Act does not provide for the 
setting aside of a judgment, a number of worthy claimants may be 
uncompensated if it is assumed that notice can never be waived. 
The Michigan Fund is further protected by the provision that 
the Fund is not bound by any settlement between the plaintiff and 
the defendant unless such a settlement receives the Secretary's con-
sent.50 Since the Michigan Act lacks specificity, the provision may 
45. Michigan Amendment § 7(3). 
46. The Michigan Act is less specific on the objections which the Secretary may 
and must make than are the acts of other fund states. Compare Michigan Amendment 
§ 7 with Maryland Act § 159, New Jersey Act § 39:6-70, New York Act § 611, North 
Dakota Act § 39-17-03. For the scope of the rule as to exhaustion of remedies, compare 
McGainey v. Cable, 65 N.J. Super. 202, 167 A.2d 405 (App. Div. 1961) (plaintiff's belief 
in the unlikelihood of recovery from the particular defendant does not relieve him of 
the duty to prosecute that defendant), with Gilbert v. Unsatisfied Claim &: Judgment 
Fund Bd., 85 N.J. Super. 143, 204 A.2d 204 (App. Div. 1964) (where plaintiff had 
started suit against the defendant but service could not be obtained, plaintiff was not 
under an obligation to prosecute the suit to judgment). 
47. Michigan Act §§ 8(1)-(3). Similar rules exist in other fund states. See, e.g., 
Maryland Act §§ 163-64; New Jersey Act §§ 39:6-74 to -75; New York Act § 614; North 
Dakota Act § 39-17-04. 
48. Michigan Act § 8(1). 
49. Compare Bonniwell v. Flanders, 62 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1953) (the fund's 
representative cannot waive failure of the claimant to notify of an impending default 
judgment), with Mayes v. Darby, 38 Misc. 2d 979, 239 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1963) 
(default judgment set aside and MVAIC permitted to intervene as defendant). 
50. Michigan Act § 8(4). In the other fund states, the law is somewhat different. 
Maryland compels the plaintiff to get prior court approval of a settlement with the 
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be construed to allow the Secretary to give either prior or subse-
quent consent to the whole or any part of the settlement. However, 
it is equally possible to construe the provision to require only prior 
consent, and since it is unlikely that the Secretary can be forced 
through mandamus to make payments from the Michigan Fund, 51 
the most prudent course of action would be to notify the Secretary 
and obtain his consent before the settlement is made. 
Possibly the most important provision of the Michigan Act is 
section 6 which deals with the non-judgment claim procedure. A 
person having a cause of action against a known, uninsured motorist 
may elect to forego his tort action and apply directly to the Fund for 
payment of his damages.52 Upon receipt of the claimant's applica-
tion the Secretary is to mail notice of the application to the last 
known address of the uninsured tort-feasor. The Secretary may pay 
the claimant an amount which he considers proper if the claimant 
executes a written release to the Fund of all claims arising from the 
accident, and the uninsured motorist either consents to the payment 
and agrees to repay that amount to the Fund or fails to reply and 
dispute his liability within thirty days from the date of notice.53 
Once payment is made, the Secretary is subrogated to the rights of 
the claimant and may maintain an action against the uninsured tort-
feasor either in the Secretary's or the claimant's name. Such actions 
might arise when the defendant fails to reply to the notice, or when 
the defendant defaults on the amount which he had agreed to 
repay.54 
defendant. In cases in which insurance companies as members of the fund board are 
assigned to defend uninsured motorists, the insurance companies may settle claims of 
under $2,500 with approval of the fund board and without court approval. Maryland 
Act § 161. Essentially the same procedure applies in New Jersey. New Jersey Act 
§ 39:6-72. In New York the procedure is similar to that of Maryland with the excep-
tion that the insurer cannot settle a claim for more than $2,000. Apparently no pro-
vision for settlement is made in the North Dakota Act. 
51. Although mandamus will lie to compel the execution of a ministerial duty, 
courts will not use it to control officers in the exercise of their discretion. Dearborn 
Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Dearborn, 323 Mich. 414, 35 N.W.2d 366 (1949); Nelson v. Wayne 
County, 289 Mich. 284, 286 N.W. 617 (1939). 
52. Since under the hit-and-run provisions of the statute, the identity of the auto-
mobile, its driver and its owner must be unknown, this section apparently covers 
those situations in which one of the three is known and the others are not. 
53. Michigan Amendment § 6(3)(c). The language of the Michigan Amendment 
does not, however, compel this conclusion. It states that the Secretary may make pay-
ment from the fund after notice is sent to the tort-feasor if the "person to whom a 
notice is sent ••• does not reply within 30 days of the date upon which the notice 
was sent and disputes his liability." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Thus, if the statute were 
construed literally, the Secretary may only make payment from the Michigan Fund if 
the tort-feasor does not reply within 30 days and on some day thereafter disputes his 
liability. 
54. In such cases the Secretary must immediately upon learning of the default 
suspend the defendant's license. Michigan Amendment § 6(6). 
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Section 6 of the Michigan Act, which is unique among the five 
fund statutes,55 demonstrates the liberal attitude of the drafters; a 
procedure is provided for the expeditious and inexpensive handling 
of claims and for the exercise of a considerable amount of discretion 
by the Secretary.56 It seems likely that the provision will be used 
extensively for property damage and personal injury claims where 
the amount of damages is small and easily ascertainable, for when 
the amount is insignificant, the Secretary would be less hesitant to 
pay the claimant, and the uninsured motorist-tort-feasor would be 
more likely to agree to repayment. The section is not, however, 
limited in its application to small claims. Larger personal injury 
claims which might otherwise have to be litigated, either because 
the Secretary considers the amount demanded improper or the 
uninsured disputes his liability for the amount sought, may also be 
encompassed within the section. Its effective use in these larger 
personal injury cases will, in practice, depend upon the extent to 
which the Secretary and the claimant are willing to compromise in 
order to minimize the time and expense of litigation. 
A third method of recovery in Michigan is to bring a suit 
directly against the Secretary. This procedure is available when the 
claimant has a valid cause of action but is unable to ascertain the 
identity of the owner, driver, and vehicle that injured him.57 The 
procedure is also applicable if the identity of the owner is known 
but the driver, perhaps a thief,68 is unknown. In cases in which only 
the identity of a co-tort-feasor is known, the Secretary may be joined 
in the place of the unidentified tort-feasor on the application of any 
55. The possible exception is the Maryland statute which allows the insurance 
companies who are members of the Fund Board to settle claims between plaintiffs 
and defendants. If the defendant does not agree to a particular settlement, the insurer 
who is also the company assigned to defend the fund, sends a notice of withdrawal to 
the defendant stating that the defendant must retain counsel within 30 days. If the 
defendant fails to do this, a judgment is entered against the defendant in the amount 
of the settlement offer. Maryland Act § 156A. 
56. The same provision in the Ontario statute has been described as a provision 
aimed at keeping down time and costs of litigation. See Corbett v. Rolfe, 1 Ont. 185, 
187, 47 D.L.R-2d 222, 224 (1965). 
57. Michigan Amendment §§ 12-13; Michigan Act §§ 15-17; See Maryland Act 
§§ 167-73; New Jersey Act §§ 39:6-78 to -85; New York Act §§ 617-19, 621; North 
Dakota Act § 39-17-03.l. 
58. Michigan Act § 15. It is to be noted that in all hit-and-run cases in which the 
Secretary is a defendant, the Secretary may deny any allegations in respect to the 
unidentified owner, driver, or vehicle, and he is not required to set out tl1e facts on 
which he relies. Michigan Act § 16. Similar provisions exist in other fund states. See 
Maryland Act § 170; New Jersey Act § 39:6-81; New York Act § 618(d). Michigan 
Rule 111.4 provides that all denials must be supported by the substance oE the 
matters relied upon. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 111.4. However, it is argued that the obvious 
fairness of § 15 will probably save it. See GILMORE, MICHIGAN CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE 
TRIAL § 7.209, at 74 (Supp. 1966). 
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party to the lawsuit or on the Secretary's application.59 The claimant 
may take advantage of this procedure in any of the above cases so 
long as he has made a reasonable effort to ascertain the identity of 
the owner, driver and vehicle.60 Surprisingly, the Michigan Act, 
unlike other fund state statutes,61 fails to authorize explicitly the 
Secretary's settling of suits brought against himself under the above 
procedures. However, since the Secretary is not specifically pre-
cluded from making such settlements and since such settlements 
would be beneficial to both the claimant and the Secretary in terms 
of time and money, the Secretary can be expected to adopt such a 
procedure whenever possible. 
Once judgment has been rendered against the Secretary he may 
apply under section 20 of the Michigan Act to the court for an order 
declaring "that any person was, at the time of the accident, the 
owner or driver of the motor vehicle that occasioned ... " the acci-
dent. Upon issuance of the order the named person is deemed to be 
the defendant in the action in which the judgment was rendered 
against the Secretary, and the Secretary is consequently deemed to 
have a judgment against the named person for the amount paid to 
the judgment creditor from the Fund. The obvious defect in this 
provision is its seeming authorization for the issuance of ex parte 
orders on the motion of the Secretary. 62 The provision appears to 
have been drafted almost verbatim from the Ontario Motor Vehicle 
Accident Claim Act, 63 and it finds no counterpart in the legislation 
of other fund states. 64 Although there are apparently no decisions 
59. Michigan Amendment §§ 12-13. It is important to note in this regard that the 
owner, driver and vehicle must all be unknown in order to sue the Secretary in a 
non-theft hit-and-run situation. Cf. Tinsman v. Parsekian, 65 N.J. Super. 217, 167 
A.2d 407 (App. Div. 1961). 
60. Michigan Act § 17. Such provisions exist in other fund states. See Maryland 
Act § 167(f); New Jersey Act § 39:6-78(e); New York Act § 618(a)(5). This provision 
has led to a good deal of litigation in other states as to what constitutes a reasonable 
effort to ascertain the identity of the owner, driver and vehicle. See, e.g., Gilbert v. 
Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd., 85 N.J. Super. 143, 204 A.2d 204 (App. Div. 
1964); Simmons v. Raiola, 36 Misc. 2d 555, 233 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
61. See Maryland Act § 171; New Jersey Act § 39:6-82; New York Act § 618(e). 
62. Judge Gilmore apparently sees no problem with the provision since he de• 
scribes it merely as a manner in which the Secretary may seek recovery for the Fund. 
GILMORE, op. cit. supra note 58, § 7.209, at 74. 
63. Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, 1962, IO & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 84 (Ont.), as 
amended, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Amendment Act, 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz. 2, c. 
66 (Ont.), as amended, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Amendment Act, 1965, 13 & 14 
Eliz. 2, c. 75 (Ont.). 
64. The Canadian jurisdictions in general have, however, placed comparable pro-
visions in their statutes. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 
2, c. 56, § 12 (Alta.); Motor Vehicle Act, 1955, 4 Eliz. 2, c. 13, § 298 (N. Bruns.). The 
provisions of the two statutes were obviously available for inspection by the drafters ., 
of the Michigan Act and the Michigan Amendment. The Michigan provisions, then, 
can reasonably be read in light of and in contradistinction to those two statutes. The 
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construing the Ontario provision, it is probable that it would be 
found valid since Canadian provincial legislatures are virtually 
unfettered in enacting legislation on questions of peculiarly local 
interest.65 However, the existence of American constitutional limita-
tions raises the question of the validity of the Michigan version. 
Since the section authorizes judgments to be rendered without pro-
viding for notice to the defendant, for the possibility of jury trial, 
and for the calling or confronting of witnesses, it would appear to 
be a most blatant denial of the due process of law requirement.66 If 
the drafters of the Michigan Act envisioned a section which pro-
vided a procedure similar to a declaratory judgment, the section as 
enacted represents a very poor effort of draftsmanship. It is possible, 
however, that such was not the intention since the unusual language 
of the section does not even closely resemble that found in the 
standard declaratory judgment statute.67 To avoid constitutional 
attack, therefore, the provision should be rewritten to coincide with 
the normal language of a declaratory judgment statute. 
Amounts Recoverable 
Recoveries from the Michigan Fund are limited to $10,000 for 
one person's death or injury, $20,000 for the personal injury or 
death of two or more persons in one accident and $5,000 for all 
property damage.68 An October 1965 amendment to the Michigan 
Alberta statute specifically provides for notice of hearing to the person named in the 
order, allows him to present evidence, and authorizes the judge to pass on the evi-
dence and to grant or refuse the order. The New Brunswick statute is an even 
clearer indication that the Michigan provision was meant to be a departure from the 
normal methods of acquiring a judgment. That statute specifically calls for a 
declaratory judgment proceeding to be initiated by the fund's representative if 
recovery is desired from the person thought to be the tort-feasor. 
65. "A section of a provincial statute is not invalid on the ground that it con• 
flicts with natural justice." 3 CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST (ONT.), Constitutional 
Law § 8 (1950). If the province of Ontario were to pass an act taking away property 
or money of A and giving it to B, the legislation, however unjust, would be valid so 
long as the effects of the legislation do not extend beyond the territorial limits of the 
province. Ibid. A court of law can only give effect to a provincial act, lawfully passed, 
according to its tenor. The suggestion that a certain act might be abused so as to 
amount to a practical confiscation does not warrant interference by the courts. Id. § 9. 
66. Seemingly, the lack of provision for notice to the defendant is the most 
blatant denial of due process. In Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928), it was held 
that a state statute which failed to make provision for reasonable notice to be given 
to a non-resident defendant when the Secretary of State was served under the non• 
resident motorist statute in his place denied due process of law. It should also be 
noted that the Michigan Constitution guarantees that the right to jury trial shall 
remain. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14. 
67. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 521 is typical of a declaratory judgment provision in 
providing for jury trial and notice. 
68. Michigan Amendment § 23(1). The limits in the other fund states are: Mary-
land, $15,000/$30,000/$5,000 (Maryland Act § 162); New Jersey, $10,000/$20,000/ 
$5,000 (New Jersey Act § 39:6-73); New York, $10,000/$20,000 (New York Act § 610); 
North Dakota, $10,000/$20,000 (North Dakota Act § 39-1707). A problem exists which 
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Act00 abolished the provision for the fifty dollar deductible on death 
and personal injury claims70 and raised the property damage deduct-
ible from fifty to nv-o hundred dollars.71 In addition, the amend-
ment excluded from coverage all property damage claims in hit-and-
run situations, 72 presumably to avoid fraudulent claims by persons 
who have damaged their own property.73 It appears that no reason 
has been formally advanced to justify abolishing the personal injury 
deductible, and the change is difficult to justify on practical 
grounds. The Michigan Secretary of State has said that the ad-
ministrative expense in processing claims of under three hundred 
dollars may be prohibitive.74 In the absence of any practical ex-
perience in administering the Fund, it may be contended that an 
increase in the deductible for personal injuries, such as that for 
property damage, would have been a more realistic method, at least 
for the present, for insuring the efficient administration and con-
tinued viability of the Michigan Fund.75 
The Michigan Act requires that no payment shall be made from 
the Fund, in respect to a claim or judgment presented, for any 
amount of money paid or payable to the claimant by any insurer or 
any other person by reason of the existence of a policy, contract, 
agreement or arrangement providing for payment of compensation, 
indemnity or other benefits.76 The impact of this provision, how-
ever, is substantially mitigated by the fact that no deduction is re-
quired for amounts payable to the claimant under a life insurance 
policy or any contract, agreement, or policy providing for the pay-
ment of hospital or medical expenses.77 This unique life and hospi-
is not provided for in the statute but which may be taken care of by administrative 
ruling. This problem arises when two or more persons are injured in the same 
accident with damages of more than $20,000 aggregate. In North Dakota the statute 
itself provides that a pro rata share is to go to each party. North Dakota Act 
§ 39-17-09. 
69. Mich. Pub. Acts. 1965, No. 389. 
70. Compare Michigan Act §§ 6-7, 19, with Michigan Amendment §§ 6-7, 19. 
71. Compare Michigan Act§§ 6-7, 19, with Michigan Amendment §§ 6-7, 19. 
72. Compare Michigan Act § 13 with Michigan Amendment § 13. 
73. The same rule is in force in New Jersey. Cf. Lewis v. Engelhardt, 79 N.J. 
Super. 171, 191 A.2d 75 (L. 1963). 
74. See Ann Arbor Conference 30. 
75. With only claims of over three hundred dollars being processed, the Secretary 
would be authorized to pay the amount of the claim over that figure and reclaim 
as much as possible of the whole sum from the uninsured to defray administrative 
costs. See Michigan Amendment § 6(4). 
76. Michigan Amendment §§ 22(2)-(3). The statute also precludes the claimant 
from seeking payment to reimburse or indemnify persons who have made payment 
to him pursuant to any policy, contract agreement or arrangement. Michigan Amend-
ment § 22(5). Compare l\laryland Act §§ 159(1)-(m); New Jersey Act §§ 39:6-70(1)-(m); 
New York Act §§ 6ll(f)-(g). 
77. Michigan Amendment § 22(4). This provision is apparently not in effect in 
any other fund state. 
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tal insurance provision is apparently intended to reward those per-
sons who have purchased their own protection.78 However, by 
merely ignoring the existence of a significant source of compensa-
tion for the average claimant, the provision does not comport with 
any reasonable pattern of damage allocation. Although laudable for 
encouraging the purchase of private insurance, the provision un-
justifiably places an extra burden on the Fund by helping those 
persons who have been fortunate enough to help themselves. 
As originally written the Michigan Act reduced the maximum 
amount payable from the Fund on a judgment debt by an amount 
equal to that recovered from any other source in partial discharge 
of the judgment debt.79 The Michigan Amendment, however, 
deletes the former rule and, in effect, subtracts the amount re-
covered from other sources from the judgment before limiting the 
recovery to the maximum amount payable from the Fund.80 The 
Amendment, which is a departure from the rule established in other 
fund states, raises the question of the basic purpose of the Michigan 
Act. The New Jersey Act, for example, has been construed as an 
attempt to afford an accident victim only a specified and uniform 
amount,81 rather than total compensation for his injuries. To this 
end, the New Jersey Act reduces the amount available from the New 
Jersey Fund by an amount received by the claimant from other 
sources. 82 Michigan, on the other hand, seems to create excess in-
surance for the victim who is also able to recover from private 
sources.83 A Michigan claimant may sustain damages similar to those 
of a New Jersey claimant, and both may collect $10,000 from other 
sources. In both states $10,000 is the maximum amount recoverable 
from the funds.84 If the total amount of damages has not been satis-
fied by the $10,000, the Michigan claimant may proceed against the 
Michigan Fund for the unsatisfied portion of his claim up to 
$10,000 while the New Jersey claimant is precluded from asserting 
any claim against the New Jersey Fund. The unfortunate weakness 
in the Michigan approach is its disparate treatment of Michigan 
residents; indeed, the Michigan Act is constituted so as to provide 
78. See Letter From Rep. Marvin R. Stempien to the Michigan Law Review, Nov. 
1, 1965. 
79. Michigan Act § 23(2). 
80. Michigan Amendment § 23(2). 
81. See Wormack v. Howard, 33 N.J. 139, 162 A.2d 846 (1960). 
82. New Jersey Act § 39:6-7l(b)(2); see Lewis v. Engelhardt, 79 N.J. Super. 
171, 191 A.2d 75 (L. 1963) (amounts received from joint-tort-feasors reduced the 
amount plaintiff could claim from the fund). 
83. See Letter From Rep. Marvin R. Stempien, op. cit. supra note 78. Representative 
Stempien suggests that this treatment as excess coverage encourages persons to 
insure themselves since they then are able to claim two sources. 
84. See note 68 supra. 
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the opportunity for greater compensation to those who can best 
afford to provide their own protection than to those with lower 
incomes, who may be unable to afford private insurance. Such 
anomalous treatment does not comport with any reasonable scheme 
of allocating the social costs of automobile accidents. It would seem 
that if the Michigan Fund can afford to be an excess insurer of 
insured persons injured by uninsured motorists, it should first raise 
its maximum amounts payable to $15,000 or $20,000. However, if 
the Michigan Fund cannot afford the extra expense, as is likely the 
case, a provision similar to New Jersey's is more easily justified than 
the present provision. 
Notice Requirements 
The Michigan Act requires that the claimant file notice of his 
intention to claim with the Secretary within one year from the date 
that the cause of action accrues. 85 The Michigan notice provision is 
significantly less complicated and more liberal than similar provi-
sions in other fund state statutes.86 Although it enables recovery for 
persons who by their own or their attorney's inadvertence would be 
precluded from recovery because of the shorter time period in other 
states,87 the Michigan Act fails to recognize the need for stringency 
in order to prevent the presentation of fraudulent claims.88 It would 
seem that a solution embodying the best elements of the liberal and 
strict positions would be to adopt the more stringent requirements 
while empowering the Secretary, in his descretion, to waive the 
deadline in the interest of justice.89 
Conclusion 
The most striking features of the Michigan Act are its liberality 
with regard to persons entitled to claim, claim procedure, deduc-
tions, notice requirements, and the greater degree of discretion 
vested in the Secretary. These factors mark a decisive split with the 
procedures of other fund states. Because the Ontario statute has only 
been in effect for four years, experience under this type of statute is 
not as great as under the prototype of the Maryland, New Jersey, 
85. Michigan Act § 18. 
86. See Maryland Act § 154; New Jersey Act § 39:6-65; New York Act § 608. 
See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 760 (1965). 
87. See McCullough, The Uninsured Motorist, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 343 (1961). 
88. This, at any rate, is the avowed purpose of the provisions of other states. See, 
e.g., Downing v. Stewart, 85 N.J. Super. 62, 203 A.2d 724 (App. Div. 1964). 
89. Other fund states, while not providing for a discretionary waiver by the fund's 
representative do have provisions which alleviate the harshness of the general rule in 
some situations. See New Jersey Act § 39:6-65 (allowing physical incapacity of the 
claimant to toll the 90-day period); New York Act § 608 (allowing infants to file late 
where the fund is not prejudiced). 
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or New York Acts. However, it seems likely that the end result of 
the liberal and discretionary character of the Michigan Act will be 
more extreme, either good or bad, than in other fund states. For 
example, if section 6 of the Michigan Act functions normally, the 
vast majority of persons injured by uninsured motorists will receive 
compensation in much less time and with less expense than would 
be required to collect the same amount from an insured tort-feasor. 
On the other hand, the Secretary could, through the exercise of his 
discretion, create, in effect, an insurance group which sought to 
permit recovery in as few cases as possible. This liberal attitude may 
lead to a comprehensive strict liability compensation system either 
supplementing the present tort framework,90 or to a great degree 
replacing such a framework.91 Although it is unlikely that such plans 
will be adopted in the near future, it is hoped that the liberal atti-
tude of the Michigan legislature may act as a stimulant for research 
on the problem of the compensation of automobile accident victims. 
90. See CONARD, MORGAN PRATI, VOLTZ &: BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CoSTS 
AND PAYMENTS (1965). The Conard "Social Insurance" Plan is, in essence, a combina-
tion of expanded existing programs of compensation, including the tort system, under 
a compensation plan administered under the social security system. This book is 
especially significant for Michigan practitioners since it contains and is based on a 
survey of Michigan accident costs and compensation. 
91. See generally KEETON &: O'CONNELL. The essential features of the new plan are 
a form of compulsory automobile insurance which is in the nature of an extension of 
the principle of medical payments insurance, covering all out-of-pocket losses up to 
,$10,000 and, second, legislation exempting basic insureds from tort liability up to 
a certain amount. A bill patterned after this proposal has been introduced into the 
Michigan Senate. S.B. 660, 73d Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1965). 
